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REMARKS ON THE GJIL SYMPOSIUM ON
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
VIIAN GROSSWALD CURRAN*

I.

OVERVIEW

Early in the Supreme Court oral arguments in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.,1 Justice Kennedy alerted the plaintiffs' lawyer that, for
him, "the case turns on this: ... '[n] o other nation in the world permits
its court[s] to exercise universal civil jurisdiction over alleged extraterritorial human rights abuses to which the nation has no connection.
That statement, in which Justice Kennedy quoted from a defendant's
amicus brief, is true when taken literally. It is misleading, however,
inasmuch as it fails to take into account that analogous actions are
allowed in the civil law world of Continental Europe when one transcends a literal understanding, as required when transposing meaning
from one legal system onto another. Universal jurisdiction forjus cogens
violations has found a footing in the criminal, but not civil, law of
civilian states for reasons tied to deep systemic attributes not shared by
the U.S. legal order.
The Second Circuit in Kiobel might have been hesitant to immunize
corporations from liability under international law had it been more
familiar with the outlook of the civil law world that not only separates
criminal from tort law, but that through a long history has constructed
innumerable associations and connections in each of those two areas of
law that U.S. legal, historical, social and political associations and
connections do not replicate. The differences which separate criminal
and tort law emerge principally from their different treatment of
public and private (here, criminal and tort) law, and not-as the
Second Circuit majority concluded in Kiobel-from their treatment of
juridical and natural persons.
The Continental European countries of Western Europe are in a
period of legal transition. The law of the European Union is maturing

* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburg. © 2012, Vivian Grosswald Curran.
1. 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (No. 10-1491), argued Feb.
28, 2012, restored to calendarfor reargument, 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (No. 10-1491). The Court is
expected to decide Kiobel in the 2012 Term.
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S.
argued Feb. 28, 2012).
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and its legal actors, from lawyers to judges, are increasingly aware of
each others' legal systems, as well as the legal practices of the United
States. The tort lawsuit has not been integrated into civilian law as a
remedy for grave violations of human rights, but civilian litigants have
knocked at that door, and on occasion European courts have allowed it
to open.
Most recently, a court in The Hague granted a civil recovery of one
million Euros to a Palestinian physician who sued the Libyan government for torture he suffered at the hands of Colonel Moammar
Gadhafi's regime in Libya.3 Other cases in civilian systems have met
with initial success, only to be reversed on appeal. 4 Such cases are
particularly illuminating for the common law lawyer, as they illustrate
those attributes that carry legal significance in civilian systems, and why.
II.

FOREIGN LAW MATTERS

A Ninth Circuit judge described the current state of judicial opinions-to which one might add secondary literature- on the question
of corporate responsibility under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)3 as "a
plethora of opinions that cannot agree on what 'the law of nations'
prohibits."6 A striking amount of formalism and deductive reasoning
characterizes the analysis, to a degree unusual in common law legal
reasoning. The tight, Cartesian style of logical rigor has not, however,
prevented the proliferation of an array of differing approaches and
solutions. In a role reversal, recent civil law commentary on the ATS
has tended to be more normative than formalistic.
The ATS creates a peculiar encounter with foreign law that goes
beyond the conflict issues of whether to opt for foreign law applicability, and the challenge of applying a foreign state's law. It requires
consideration of foreign legal concepts concurrently and in intertwined fashion with U.S. legal concepts. Accomplishing this feat involves scrutinizing legal conclusions lest they result from unwarranted
U.S. legal projections, and therefore constitute "illusions of validity. " 7 It
also suggests that the categories being used to delineate analysis in
circuit court opinions are porous. Thus, while it is true that a character-

3. See, e.g., Rb. Gravenhage [Court of First Instance of The Hague] 21 maart 2012 [Mar. 21,
2012], m nt.Van der Helm, Case 400882/HA ZA 11-2252 (El Hojouj/Derbal) (Neth.).
4. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Globalization, Legal Transnationalizationand Crimes Against
Humanity: theLipietz Case, 56 AM.J. COMP. L. 363 (2008).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
6. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 797 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting).
7. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 209 (2011).
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ization of "remedy" or "method" as opposed to "substance" would
warrant differing results under ATS analysis, those categories are not
neatly separable. Similarly, the categories of 'Jurisdiction" and "cause
of action," typically opposed to each other in ATS analysis, are also
enmeshed within one another. These categories, debated in the secondary literature as well as in the parties'- briefs, also were the subject of
disagreement at the Kiobel oral argument in the Supreme Court.8 Part
of the issue in delineating categories stems from the ATS's connection
to foreign law.
U.S. federal courts have not been eager to examine foreign law in
recent years. Among the reasons for avoiding foreign law are the
natural propensity of courts to favor the law of the forum, a propensity
not limited to the United States, and the difficulty for judges to
decipher the appropriate legal principles. The plaintiffs in Kiobel
argued that the Supreme Court did not need to examine foreign law
because corporate liability was an issue on the merits, and, as such,
arose under U.S. federal common law.9 According to judge Leval in his
substantive dissent from the reasoning of the Second Circuit's Kiobel
opinion'°-as well as the majority opinions in Doe v. Exxon" and
Flomo12 -plaintiffs' ATS allegations of crimes against humanity are
claims regarding incontrovertible international law violations, while
the corporate liability issue is merely one of method or remedy, rather
than substance. State domestic law controls questions of method under
principles of international law. Although my own suggestion is that
corporate tort liability for crimes against humanity needs to be viewed
as the United States' way of handling an issue from its common law
perspective, I do not mean by that to suggest that it is not also a
substantive matter.
The risk inherent in reducing the corporate liability issue strictly to a
matter of method, which does not involve other countries or their law,
is the risk of ignoring the necessary overlap and interconnection
between method and substance, and the risk that what one state
considers method another may consider substance. For instance, if
every foreign "civilized state" held that immunizing corporations from
liability was contrary to its public policy as a matter of its substantive law,

8. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 45.
9. Id. at 21.
10. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 150 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval,J.,
concurring in judgment only).
11. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 23-24 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
12. SeeFlomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 2011).
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the U.S. Supreme Court would not be likely to impose an entirely
iconoclastic solution on the rest of the world, even if U.S. domestic law
viewed it as a remedial matter, especially when the legislative intent of
the ATS was to increase the United States' harmonious relations with
other countries by removing jurisdiction from state courts more likely
to cause difficulties in the United States' relations with other nations.
ATS analysis in the absence of foreign law analysis thus risks undermining the statute's purpose.
A recurrent thread throughout the appellate court ATS decisions,
from Kiobel through Rio Tinto, concerns the nature of the ATS as a tort
statute existing within the confines of civil law, while the Nuremberg
trials dealt with criminal law and penalties.1 3 The Kiobel majority
explained that it applied criminal law standards to ATS acts, though in
tort law. 14 While such statements sound straightforward, their application may be fraught with difficulty in practice, because the criminal law
standards against which U.S. courts must affix ATS issues are deeply
embedded in other socio-historico-legal traditions and in the associations those systems have constructed between criminal and civil (i.e.,
tort) law divisions.15
III.

A LOOK ABROAD

Each particular civilian country has its own national criminal law,
influenced by its particular historical context and evolving circumstances. Nevertheless, underlying differentiating characteristics are
widespread between the codified countries of Continental Europe (the
civilian states to which the four appellate courts in and since Kiobel have
looked) and the common law legal system of the U.S. Some of these
differences become apparent in Lipietz, a case brought in France in
1994 by Remi Rouquette, a lawyer who was very familiar with U.S. cases
that had been filed by victims of persecution in France during the
Second World War.1 6
Like the plaintiffs in the U.S. cases, Mr. Rouquette asserted a claim

13. SeeDoev. Exxon, 654 F.3d at 23-24; Homo, 643 F.3d at 1019; Kiobe4 621 F.3d at 150.
14. Kiobe4 621 F.3d at 117.
15. See Beth Stephens, TranslatingFilgrtiga: A Comparativeand InternationalLaw Analysis of
Domestic Remedies for InternationalHuman Rights Violations,27 YALEJ. INT'L. L. 1 (2002).
16. Tribunal administratif [TA] [Administrative Court] Toulouse, June 6, 2006, availableat
http://helene.lipietz.net/IMG/pdf/ugement.pdf. An English translation by Anne Witt, as revised by Vivian Grosswald Curran, is available at http://www.acaccia.fr/IMG/pdf/Judgment
Lipietzenglish.pdf. The subsequent reversal by the Bordeaux Administrative Court of Appeal
(Cour d'Appel de Bordeaux) was upheld by the Supreme Court (Conseil d'Etat), whose decision of
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under tort law theory for crimes against humanity on behalf of his
clients (one of whom was his father-in-law, Georges Lipietz) in a French
court. The facts of the case concerned two cousins who had been
arrested during WWII under the anti-Semitic laws of France's collaborationist government. The plaintiffs sued the French government as well
them to an internment
as the railroad company that had transported
7
conditions.'
inhumane
under
camp
Remarkably, the lower court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, finding a tort
violation, although the underlying allegations concerned crimes against
humanity, there had been no criminal proceeding, and none was
contemplated. In doing so, the court broke dramatically with tradition.
However, the case was reversed on appeal,' with the reversal affirmed
by the Supreme Court (Conseil d'Etat).9 Similar suits had been brought

for wartime crimes in France, with convicted defendants in the past
obliged to remunerate victims financially, but this case was controversial because it had been brought entirely outside of a criminal law
context. Matters normally within the public domain were seen as
having been privatized by a plaintiffs' lawyer because he managed the
case, rather than the state. In the French system, a privately-hired
lawyer is the institutional actor seen as the least neutral, and as suspect
for wanting to win rather than to promote an understanding of the
truth. The problem, in short, was the transposition to France of the
Anglo-American legal concept of tort liability for a grave human rights
violation.
The increasingly blurred line between public and private law that was
criticized in Lipietz is a serious concern in civilian states today. If
punitive damages have long been anathema to civilian states because
punishment is seen as belonging to criminal, not tort, law, it is because
the appropriation of punitive measures by tort law is considered to be
the privatization ofjustice, and hence, an impingement on the domain
of the State.
In Lipietz, although critics denounced the case for having been

Dec. 21, 2007 is available in French at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/jurispd/indexacId0743.
shtml.
17. The government did not appeal its loss in the lower court, so the appellate case
concerned only the railway company.
18. Cour d'Appel [CA] de Bordeaux [Court of Appeals of Bordeaux], Mar. 27, 2007, available
at http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/20120510T60724-Lipietz%20et%20al.%20v.%20
SNCF%20-%2ODecision%20-%2027-03-2007.pdf.
19. Conseil d'ftat [CE Sect.] [highest administrative court], Dec. 21, 2007, Rec. Lebon 139,
available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/jurispd/indexacId0743.shtml.
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brought by a private lawyer, the plaintiffs and their lawyer in fact were
bringing the action in tort law very much in the spirit of U.S. tort law
cases. More specifically, it was modeled on the common law tort cases
that are meant to address matters of public concern, in order to give
plaintiffs a public voice, and to generate public discussion that eventually can lead to the very legal developments that initially may have been
raised prematurely. One indication that the Lipietz lawyer was similarly
motivated is suggested by the plaintiffs' having presented some legal
theories which might have hurt their own case, in order to preserve
legal options for future, similarly situated plaintiffs.
Criticism of the plaintiffs came from many quarters and focused on
repugnance at the implicit message that human misery can be compensable by monetary awards. Critics also decried the trial's alleged swiftness as preclusive of deliberative judgment, in contrast to the recent
criminal trial of wartime collaborator Maurice Papon that had gone on
for many months. 20 Finally, the case's critics saw as problematic that the
plaintiffs' lawyer only made legal arguments that served his clients,
rather than address the important historical problems at issue.
French law allows victims of crimes to pursue financial redress by
joining the criminal law trial as a partie civile, or "civil party," a procedure duly noted by the Second Circuit in Kiobel. 2 1 But a French
criminal trial has significant differences in both form and substance
from its common law counterpart. A first clue comes from the very
word English speakers translate as "trial": the French word is "procis."
The French trial is, as the etymology of its name would suggest, a
veritable "process," of which only the final phase is oral. Thus, a
frequent incorrect association is to conflate the oral phase of the
French trial with the Anglo-Saxon concept of "trial."
Most importantly, the principal players in the French and, generally,
civilian criminal trial are the judges, and their role extends beyond
judging the guilt of defendants. One of their important tasks ispedagogical: educating the public on behalf of the state.Judges in France, as
in most civil law states, are endowed with didactic powers unshared by
the U.S. tort law judge. Indeed, non-criminal cases take place through
writings, by means of mLmoires (submissions), without witness or other
testimony, except for final, oral lawyer statements. One French scholar
believes that the "triangular relationship among the public authority,

20. Tribunal administratif [TA] [Administrative Court] Paris, Apr. 12, 2002, available at
http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/20120612T021301-papon-conseil-Etat-decision_12-0402.pdf.
21. SeeKiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 137 (2d Cir. 2010).
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the defendant[,

and the partie civile victim" 2 2 is the hallmark of the

criminal law and also the reason that crime victims should not be able
to seek financial redress outside of the criminal law context.
A great French scholar once explained that criminal trials are part
and parcel of political statements, stating that a "Frenchman knows
that [criminal law] is not and cannot be law in the strict sense[,]" 2 3 and

"[he] will allow the government a degree of... even arbitrariness[]
that is hard to reconcile with the certainty characteristic of legal
principles." 24 The French criminal trial, as is also the case in other civil
law states, puts the presidingjudge in charge of"a symbolic process that
involves conveying a social message."2 5 The French criminal law judge
has been called a "republican monarch," 26 the very voice of the state,
analyzing the import of historically valuable trials and explaining them
to the citizenry in the name of the nation. If the judge can focus on so
many issues collateral to the defendant's guilt, it is because issues of
guilt and innocence generally have been resolved, often through
confession, at some earlier point in the "process."
The United States does not endow its judges with the formidable
powers of the French criminal lawjudge, in large measure because the
role of the state is different in its relation both to its courts and to the
governed. Although the U.S. may be influenced by Rousseau, in France
the theoretical foundational idea has been the Rousseauist one of a
citizenry which by means of a social contract cedes its individual
interests when operating as citizens in a public space, and of a government which embodies the general will of that citizenry, and therefore
merges with it at the same time that it leads the citizenry to virtue.
One understands better now some of the domestic criticisms leveled
at the first instance court in the Lipietz case, such that it decided too
rapidly, despite the fact that the lower court had taken more than five
years from the date of plaintiffs' formal filing to render its decision in
2006. What perturbed many was, no doubt, the contrast with the

22. Yves Strickler, Apris la Crise de l'Affaire d'Outreau: l'Emotion et la ProcidurePinale [After the
Crisisof the Outreau Affair: Emotion and CriminalProcedure], 249 PETrrEs AFFICHES [OmCtAL NoTiCEs]

7, 10 (Dec. 14, 2006).
23. RENE DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOuRcES AND METHODOLOGY 119 (Michael
Kindred trans., 2011).
24. Id. at 120.
25. Curran, supra note 4, at 377. See also Stewart Field, State, Citizen, and Characterin the French
CriminalProcess, 33J. L. & Soc'Y 522, 527, 537 (2006).
26. Field, supranote 25, at 540 (citing P. Le Quinquis, LePrisidentde la Courd'Assises[President
of the Court of Assizes], 10 REVUE GENERAL DE DROIT PROCESSUEL [GENERAL REVIEW OF PROCEDURAL
LAW] 99, 100 (1998)).
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criminal trials of Vichy collaborators such as Touvier2 7 or Papon.2 s The
trial in Lipietz was not conducted in public, as those two had been, nor
could it be, precisely because Lipietz was not heard by a criminal law
court. As a tort case, the party memoranda and filings constituted the
entirety of the case, and even those filings were outside of the public
domain, because, under French law, they are the intellectual property
of their authors.
Thus, however wrong the critics may have been not just concerning
the rapidity of the case, but also plaintiffs' motives in bringing the case,
when they accused the plaintiffs and their lawyer of seeking only to win,
the case was not played out in public because it was asserted under tort
theory. In the United States, by contrast, all of the filings would have
been public, and an oral jury trial would have, or could have, occurred,
so that the issues would have been aired in a public forum.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Tort law in the United States fulfills many of the functions of
criminal law in civilian states in the context of the grave violations of
human rights that are the subject of the ATS. Both offer a forum in
which to publicize the defendant's criminal acts and the victim's
suffering; both represent a search for justice; and both offer a means
for financial redress. These are, however, similarities but not identical
features. In particular, the degree to which the state legitimates criminal law trials in France is not paralleled by the public aspects and
punitive damages of U.S. tort trials. Accordingly, it would not be
accurate to equate the functions of civilian criminal law with those of
U.S. tort law, as each retains significant distinctions linked to different
histories and traditions. On the other hand, it now is clear why civilian
states that adopt universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity do
so in a criminal law context, and why civil liability for the same
underlying acts in the United States may be considered an equivalent
cause of action.

27. Cour de cassation (Cass.] crim.,June 1, 1995, Bull. crim., No. 42.
28. TA Paris, Apr. 12, 2002, availableat http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/20120612T
021301-papon-conseilEtatdecision_l 2-04-02.pdf
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